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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the comparative impact of country specific degree of IFRS 
implementation upon the accuracy and bias of West European and East European firms equity 
securities analysts earnings forecasts for 29 European countries 12 of which are characterized as 
being East European.  We utilize measures of equity securities analysts earnings forecast 
accuracy and bias in making comparisons of the impact of country specific degree of IFRS 
implementation upon the statistical properties of earnings forecasts for firms having domiciles in 
East European and West European countries.  Our results indicate that (1) analysts earnings 
forecast accuracy and earning forecast bias decreases in the sense that their association with 
magnitudes earnings changes decreases in relation with country specific degree of implementation 
of IFRS and (2) the degree of reduction in analysts earnings forecast accuracy and bias is 
statistically more pronounced for East European firms than for West European Firms.  Our 
results persist after controlling for cross-listing of ADRs on US securities exchanges.   Bases upon 
this evidence we conclude that the benefits of implementation of IFRS is marginally greater for 
East European firms that for West European firms. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 substantial body of analysts earning forecast literature documents the statistical properties – i.e., 
forecast accuracy and bias – for U.S. vs. non U.S. companies listed in the U.S. (e.g., Das and 
Saudagaran [2002 and 1998]).  The literature is particularly substantial for European firms earnings 
forecasts.
1
  Furthermore, a considerable stream of related research examines the impact of differences in home 
country accounting standards and the utilization of IFRS (i.e, International Financial Reporting Standards) based 
earnings forecasts (Ashbaugh and Pincus [2001]).
2
 
                                                 
1 .  Beckers, Steliaros and Thomsen (2004) conducted research on Bias in European analysts’ earnings forecasts. They found an 
optimistic bias on the part of analysts when they forecast corporate earnings of European listed companies. There findings are  
consistent with Capstaff, Paudyal, and Rees (1995) who found that analyst forecasts of United Kingdom firm earnings have a 
persistent optimism. This optimism has also been found in research on earnings forecasts of United States firms by Dreman and 
Berry (1995). Capstaff (1998) found this persistent optimism also for German firms.  
 
2 .  Lang, Lins, and Miller [2003] investigate the impact of country-of-domicile on equity security analyst forecasts accuracy for 
U.S.-listed companies.  Hope [2003] addresses the association between the degree of enforcement of accounting standards and 
A 
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We extend prior research to compare the impact of country specific degree of IFRS implementation on the 
accuracy and bias of analyst earnings forecast errors for East European firms as compared to West European firms. 
We find in our research that the degree of implementation of IFRS decreases earnings forecast accuracy and the 
optimistic bias of analysts earning for both East European and West European firms.  However, when compared to 
Western European firms, the statistical impact of degree of implementation of IFRS is statistically more pronounced.  
We surmise that when analysts are forecasting the earnings of firms with a East European domicile, IFRS are 
marginally more informative for these firms than for firms having a Western European origin.  In parallel, we also 
surmise that when analysts are forecasting the earnings of firms of Eastern European origin they are using many 
information sources of a Eastern European origin – which, perhaps, makes the IFRS marginally more beneficial for 
these firms than for West European firms.  Western European information sources necessarily are influenced and 
even determined by the idiosyncratic characteristics of Western Europeans. Similarly Eastern European information 
sources necessarily are influenced and determined by the idiosyncratic characteristics of Eastern Europeans.  This 
study makes a noteworthy contribution to the extant literature regarding the statistical properties of equity securities 
analysts earnings forecasts and the usefulness of IFRS by illustrating the importance of the culture contextual 
dimension of the usefulness of IFRS to equity securities analysts earnings forecasting task and the overall quality of 
disclosure comprising firms information environment. 
 
In this next section we will review the existing literature that examines the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
Eastern European peoples and cultures in order to explore if there is evidence of a greater persistent optimism in 
Eastern Europe.  This will be done to provide possible explanations of why we find a stronger optimistic bias to 
earnings forecasts of the earnings of Eastern European firms. Also in the next section we will provide some citations 
to the literature to document that the short history of the European stock markets and the many difficulties of the 
evolving Eastern European economic institutions might provide some measure of a logical explanation for why 
analysts’’ earnings forecasts of Eastern European firms are less accurate overall than those for Western European 
Firms. The second section describes the data and empirical method and research hypotheses employed in our 
research study.  The results of the statistical models and hypotheses tests are presented and discussed in the third 
section of the paper.  The fourth section discusses the conclusions of this research and provides some suggestions for 
possible future avenues of inquiry. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND SOME POSSIBLE REASONS FOR OUR EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES  
 
We will refer to Eastern Europeans as Russians, and we will also refer to  Russians as Eastern Europeans, 
as is often the case in the literature.  We will use the terms interchangeably. Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (1991) 
found in some 1990 field research that, “Soviet and American respondents were basically similar ”in their attitudes 
toward free markets.”  Their field research did not directly assess Soviet optimism, but in their closing remarks it is 
clear that in similar circumstances they expected Russians to behave as Americans in every way.  This view is 
consistent with Joyce (1984) who had the opinion that Russians in the Soviet period had a bleak world view only 
because of the harsh conditions existing in Soviet Russia.  
 
The Soviet Union ended in 1991, and evidence of Russian optimism related to stock markets under the new 
and changed economic and political conditions soon burst forth.  Almost simultaneously several thousand stock 
markets and commodity exchanges were created. Goldman (2003) observes the obvious, “That was many more than 
a normal market could sustain.”  Commenting on Russian optimism in what looks to a westerner to be very difficult 
or impossible circumstances, Lebaron and Carpenter (2002) offer “an old Russian saying.”  The saying is, “The 
fishing is best in troubled waters.”  So optimism is possible and perhaps even well-advised in the most trying of free 
market times. 
 
We take note that Locus (2001) considers that the traditional Russian fatalism as the product of 
helplessness in influencing outcomes.  The return of the market economy has given Russia back the powerful engine 
of the market economy.  Discussing the new Russian optimism Young (1996) quotes a Russian entrepreneur who 
                                                                                                                                                             
analyst forecasts accuracy, as well as the impact of degree of accounting disclosure upon analysts forecast accuracy.   
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says simply, “But all obstacles are there to be overcome.”  Similarly, Harper (1999) comments on the first 
significant marketing research done in Russia, “The response was extremely positive.” 
 
Russians are now observed profiting from accepting risk, instead of avoiding it.  Blakeley (2002) worked in 
post-Soviet Siberia, and he opined that he thought Russian businessmen were more creative and more willing to take 
risks than their American counterparts.  Stewart, Carland, Carland, Watson, and Sweo (2003) discovered in a 
controlled study that the risk propensity of United States income-focused entrepreneurs was “not significantly 
higher” than that of similarly focused entrepreneurs from Russia. 
 
There is new evidence that indicates that more positive attitudes about the future are behind the developing 
Russian optimism.  A new Public Opinion Foundation poll (2007) “found a significant change when it comes to the 
public’s impression of the Russian economy.” A Pew Global Attitudes Project from 2005 found that 45% of 
Russians could be termed an optimist when, “Optimism is calculated by subtracting a respondent’s current position 
on the ladder of life from his/her expected position five years from now.” On the other hand, only 16% of Russians 
were considered to a pessimist.  The remaining Russians were classified as neutral, or as “didn’t know.”   
 
What kind of characteristics are behind the improvement of managers in Russia?  De Vires, Shekshina, 
Korotov and Florent-Treacy (2004) found there are more and more individuals with Western business education and 
experience. Even those with no direct Western contact are now likely to have been exposed to Western ideas and 
concepts at Russian universities.  Gratchev, Rogovsky, and Ratitski, (2006) have identified certain important 
characteristics of Russian managers in their research on leadership and culture in Russia.  These positive 
characteristics are, “courage and ability to launch large-scale projects, decisiveness.”  
 
The increasingly prevalent Russian optimism might provide an explanation of the more positively skewed 
Eastern European earnings forecasts.  
 
The difficulties and uncertainties the transitional Russian economy might explain why Eastern European 
firms often have less accurate earnings forecasts.  Boyarshinov (2006) noted that, “Distinctive features of the 
Russian stock market are its short history (when compared to European markets), and its relative instability (even 
over such a short period of time).  Also, significant is the strong vulnerability of the Russian stock market to the 
political situation. This is a contributor to stock market volatility.  On a positive note, Smith (2003) observes that 
Russian tycoons now see themselves as part of a global equity market, a viewpoint he believes has revolutionary 
implications for the Russian economy.  A fledgling market economy is likely a more difficult environment in which 
to forecast earnings. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with Gannon [2002, p. 129].  Blakeley (2002) observes 
Russians seem initially to take extreme views, and they are more comfortable with risk, and thus perhaps Russians 
are more enthusiastic about earnings forecasts than justified.  The underlying  transitional nature of the entire 
Russian economy as reported by Gustafson [1999] may indicate why many economic forecasts, including earnings 
forecasts, are problematic.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS  
 
The objective of this research is to examine the impact of differential degree of implementation of IFRS on 
the accuracy and bias of equity securities analysts earnings forecasts for non-U.S. companies having countries of 
domicile characterized as being East European and West European.
3
  Extant research indicates that variation in 
countries generally accepted accounting practices impacts equity securities investors interpretation of accounting 
                                                 
3 .  IFRS are accounting principles written by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) with the explicit objective of 
the creating a set of accounting principles utilized by business firms on an international basis and, as a result, increasing the 
comparability of accounting financial statements by reducing differences among countries accounting practices (i.e., Financial 
Accounting Standards Board [1996]).  In many, if not most, cases the implementation of IFRS results in the limitation of choices 
within generally accepted accounting practices and increased overall disclosure by firms.  A natural consequence of a reduction 
of choices within generally accepted accounting practices would be a more precise information set for firms implementing IFRS.   
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communications (Alford et al. [1993]).
4
  But, the inverse finding does not have unambiguous empirical support in 
the current research literature - that is, harmonization or convergence of countries accounting practices does not 
necessarily imply an improved information set for equity securities investors (Joos and Lang [1994], and Auer 
[1996]). 
 
This study investigates research hypotheses regarding the differential impact of countries degree of 
implementation of IFRS upon equity securities analysts earnings forecast accuracy
5
 and forecast bias
6
 for countries 
of domicile characterized as being East European and West European.  Generally speaking, we expect (1) the degree 
of implementation of IFRS to be associated with increased forecasting task complexity as a result of reduction of 
opportunities for earnings smoothing, and (2) and reduce earnings forecast bias as a result of IFRS producing a 
uniformly more useful set of accounting principles to equity securities investors.  However, the impact of IFRS 
depends upon existing home country accounting practices, and the degree of divergence of IFRS from existing 
country of domicile generally accepted accounting practices is a difficult notion to formulate concisely.
 7
  The 
                                                 
4 .  Questions have arisen regarding the degree of enforcement of IFRS among countries (e.g., Davis-Friday and Rueschoff 
[1998]) as well as extent of compliance with IFRS (e.g., Street, Gray, and Bryant [1999]).  The impact of changing accounting 
policies upon the statistical properties of equity securities analysts earnings forecasts is not unambiguous (Brown [1983]; Elliot 
and Philbrick [1990]).  Implementation of IFRS may reduce the extent of earnings management practices among companies and, 
consequently, may alter the statistical properties of equity securities analysts earnings forecasts. 
 
5 .  The accuracy of analysts earnings forecasts is usually assessed using the absolute value of the earnings forecast error (i.e., the 
absolute value of the actual earnings number minus the mean or median analysts earnings forecast).  Consequently, forecast 
accuracy disregards whether the forecast is over or under the actual earnings number and focuses solely on the distance of the 
mean or median analyst forecast from the actual earnings number.  A substantial body of research literature has developed 
identifying the economic determinants of the analysts earnings forecast error.  Research results reported by DeBondt and Forbes 
[1999] suggests that analysts earnings forecast errors are positively related to degree of disagreement among analysts (i.e., 
standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts).  Sinha, Brown, and Das [1997] and Capstaff [1999] report evidence indicating 
that analysts earning forecast errors are negatively associated with firm size and number of analysts following firms. 
 
6 .  The systematic tendency for analysts earnings forecast errors to be positive is called optimistic bias.  The analysts earnings 
forecast error is calculated as the mean or median earnings forecast minus actual earnings.  Consequently, on average analysts 
earnings forecasts are systematically optimistically biased.  Early research such as Dreman and Berry [1995] document a 
statistically significant optimistic bias for concensus analysts earnings forecasts over a nearly twenty five year period.  
Researchers such as Capstaff, Paudyal, and Rees [1995] and Debondt and Forbes [1999] have observed similar phenomena in 
U.K. analysts earnings forecasts,  while Capstaff et al. [1995] and Capstaff [2001] provide empirical results for Germany and the 
broader European region respectively.  Based upon the existing literature it is somewhat accepted as a stylized fact that analysts 
for U.K. and Netherlands companies tend to outperform analysts earnings forecasts for Spanish and Italian companies.  However, 
evidence regarding the comparative earnings forecasting performance of equities securities analysts in different countries remains 
limited. 
Extant literature comprised of research such as Huberts and Fuller [1995] and DeBondt and Forbes [1999] suggests that 
analysts systematic optimistic bias is positively related to earnings variability.  Research such as Das, Levine, and 
Sivaraniakrishnan [1998] indicates that analysts systematic optimistic bias is negatively associated with firm information 
environment.    Francis and Philbrick [1993],  Dowen [1996],  Butler and Saraoglu [1999],  Easterwood and Nutt [1999], provide 
evidence that analysts systematic optimistic bias is negatively associated with the magnitude of reported earnings.  Over much of 
the recent history of analysts earnings forecast literature researchers have speculated that analysts systematic optimistic bias is a 
natural reaction to new information.  DeBondt and Thaler [1990] hypothesize that security analysts over-estimate the persistent 
portion firms reported earnings increases resulting in earnings forecasts that are systematically optimistic.  DeBondt and Thaler’s 
“overreaction” hypothesis applies to earnings decreases as well but rather that analysts underestimate the persistence of 
magnitudes of earnings decreases.  The combination of the overreaction to earnings increases and underreaction to earnings 
decreases results in analysts earnings forecasts that are on average systematically optimistic. 
 
7 .  We note that firms may utilize IFRS and have very little, if any, divergence with country of domicile generally accepted 
accounting practices.  On the other hand, implementation of IFRS may result in large deviations from country of domicile 
generally accepted accounting practices and, thereby, perhaps adding considerable complexity to equity securities analysts 
earnings forecasting tasks.  Brown [1983] and Elliot and Philbrick [1990] provide compelling empirical evidence regarding 
changes in accounting methods for U.S. firms. 
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combination of reduction in choices comprising home country generally accepted accounting practices the 
accompanying overall increased quality of disclosure and should result in substantially improved equity securities 
analysts earnings forecasts exhibiting reduced average forecast accuracy and reduced optimistic forecast bias. 
 
Consequently, we intuitively expect the magnitude of degree of implementation of IFRS conditioned upon 
explicitly controlling home country accounting practices – i.e., via the East European and West European 
characterization - to be significantly associated with decreased equity securities analysts earnings forecast accuracy 
and decreased analysts earnings forecast bias.  We test null form of these hypotheses using one-tailed statistical tests 
based upon our interpretation of the research literature regarding the impact of degree of convergence toward IFRS 
upon the statistical properties of equity securities analysts earnings forecast accuracy and bias. 
 
H01:   Equity securities analysts earnings forecast accuracy and bias have no relation to country of 
domicile characterization as being East European or West European. 
H02:   Equity securities analysts earnings forecast error accuracy and bias has no relation to country 
specific degree of implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards. 
H03:   There is no difference association between equity securities analysts earnings forecast error 
accuracy and bias and country specific degree of implementation of International Financial 
Reporting Standards between East European and West European firms. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 
The research design utilized in this research identifies non U.S. country of domicile firms from the 2003 
Investment Brokers Estimate Service International Detail database.  We employ firms having non-missing annual 
earnings forecasts and historical earnings data for years 1999-2002 for firms domiciled in 29 countries from the 
European continent geographic region.  The distribution of the 29 IBES firm country of domicile over the East 
European and West European geographic regions is shown in Table 1. Table No. 2 shows the distribution of the 
sample firms individually across the Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions. 
 
The purpose the this research study is to describe the impact of degree of  country of domicile IFRS 
implementation upon the statistical properties of equity securities analysts earnings forecasts for firms across 
European countries of domicile while controlling for differences between geographic regions characterized as 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe.
8
  We utilize a variation of the traditional rational expectations earnings forecast 
model wherein the current period earnings forecast error is dependent upon the current period earnings change (i.e., 
a random walk earnings expectation).  As a result, the dependent variable utilized in this research study is analysts 
earnings forecast error which takes two forms as in the extant research literature: 
9
  
 
 Forecast Accuracy [Region]i:  Forecast Accuracy is the absolute value of the earnings forecast 
error, and; 
 Forecast Bias [Region]i :  Forecast Bias is the algebraic signed value of the earnings forecast 
error.   
                                                 
8 .  In this research study we utilize country of domicile specific pervasiveness of IFRS implementation measures for East 
European and West European countries obtained from the Deloite and Touche IASPlus website. The IASPlus website maintains a 
listing of 144 countries and rates their degree of implementation of IFRS as follows: 
 
■ IFRS Not Permitted For Domestic Listed Companies (assigned value of 0); 
■ IFRS Permitted For Domestic Listed Companies (assigned value of 1); 
■ IFRS Required For Some Domestic Listed Companies (assigned value of 2); 
■ IFRS Required For All Domestic Listed Companies (assigned value of 3). 
 
9.  Forecast accuracy measures the distance of the analysts earnings forecast from the actual reported earnings figure and forecast 
bias captures the tendency for analysts earnings forecasts to be greater than zero.  Consequently, this research study investigates 
whether analysts earnings forecasts systematically differ between East European and West European based upon differences in 
the tendency of analysts earnings forecasts errors to be (1) different from zero, and (2) greater than zero. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of IBES International Detail Country of Domicile Over East European  
and West European Geographic Regions 
 
Total Europe 
 
Austria  
Belgium 
Croatia 
Czech Republic  
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland  
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal  
Romania 
Russia  
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain  
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Western Europe 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Eastern Europe 
 
Croatia  
Czech Republic  
Estonia  
Hungary 
Latvia  
Lithuania 
Poland  
Romania  
Russia  
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Ukraine  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  IBES Forecasts 
 
 
Total Countries 
Total Europe 
 
 
Countries: 29 
 
West Europe 
 
 
Countries:17 
 
East Europe 
 
 
Countries:12 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of Sample Firms Over West European and East European Geographic Regions 
 
  Source 
 
 
IBES 
 
 
Total 
Europe 
 
 
Firms:  6744  
 
 
Firms:  6744 
West Europe 
 
 
Firms:  4892  
 
 
Firms:  4892 
East Europe 
 
 
Firms:  1852  
 
 
Firms:  1852 
 
 
The independent variables used to explicitly control for other factors which may systematically impact the 
dependent variables of interest in addition to East European and West European country of domicile are described 
below:  
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 Crossi :  An integer valued qualitative variable (e.g., 0, 1) used to capture the effect of firms 
having cross-listed securities such as ADRs in a US securities exchange. 
 Yeari :  An integer valued index to capture factors impacting sample countries and firms which are 
attributable to attributable to specific years.  
 Industryi :  An integer valued index to capture factors impacting sample countries and firms which 
are attributable to attributable to specific industries. 
 UEi:  A real valued quantitative variables taking a value equal to change in annual earnings from 
the previous year of the i
th
 European sample firm employed in this sample.   
 D[Region]i:  An integer valued qualitative variable taking a value of one if the country of domicile 
of the i
th
 sample firm is uniquely from one of the former Russian republics employed in this 
sample and is assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research design in this manner allows for the 
intercept of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and East 
European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
 X[Region]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of domicile of 
the i
th
 sample firm is from one of the former Russian republics employed in this sample and is 
assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research design in this manner allows for the UEi slope 
coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and East 
European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
 D[IAS]i:  An integer valued monotonic increasing (e.g., 0,1,2,3) index of the degree of 
implementation of IFRS for each sample firms country of domicile. 
 X[IAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of the product of the country of 
domicile of the i
th
 sample firm degree of implementation of IFRS and the magnitude of the i
th
 
sample firm actual earnings change.  Research design in this manner allows for the UEi slope 
coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the various degrees of 
implementation of IFRS subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results – i.e., 
X[IAS]i:  = D[IAS]i x UEi 
 D[RegionxIAS]i:  Integer valued interaction qualitative variable capturing the interaction between 
firms country of domicile degree of implementation of IAS and firms being characterized as 
domiciled in an East European or West European home country. The variable will take values of 
either zero or integer values one through four since it is measured as the product of IASi and 
D[Region]I (i.e., D[RegionxIAS]I = D[IAS]i x D[Region]I). 
 X[RegionxIAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of 
domicile of the i
th
 sample firm uses the lowest level of IFRS, is monotonic increasing in relation to 
degree of IFRS implementation, and zero otherwise.  Research design in this manner allows for 
the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ in relation to home 
country degee of implementation of IFRS. The variable is measured as the product of X[IAS]i and 
X[Region]I (i.e., X[RegionxIAS]i = IASX[Region]i x X[Region]I). 
 
Table No.3 shows the mean and median values for each of the dependent variables employed in the 
empirical analyses (in absolute value and algebraic form).  The data values are shown by the East European and 
West European geographic regions employed in the research study for comparative purposes.  In addition, values of 
the Kruskal-Wallis Chi-Square test statistic are shown and the related probability values under the null hypothesis of 
the equality of means across Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions.  For each data variable the 
null hypothesis of equality of means across East European and West European geographic regions is rejected at the 
α=0.05 confidence level using two-tailed Chi-Square Kruskal-Wallis tests.  Consequently, we note that the data 
values differ significantly across Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions employed in this research 
study. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for IBES Country Of Domicile Analysts Earnings Forecasts Data By Five Geographic Regions 
 
Data/Region All  Europe West Europe East Europe KW Chi Square 
Accuracyi: Mean 
Median 
N 
0.69876 
0.30625 
11367 
0.7101917 
0.3125000 
10657 
0.5271744 
0.2203150 
710 
24.9696 
0.0001† 
Biasi:  Mean  
Median 
N 
-0.50833 
-0.14141 
11367 
-0.5201358 
-0.1507660 
10657 
-0.3311708 
-0.0744420 
710 
16.0584 
0.0001† 
UE[Alg]i:  Mean  
Median 
N 
-0.22918 
0.06624 
11704 
-0.2307055 
0.0675415 
11010 
-0.2049606 
0.0393385 
694 
0.4969 
0.4808 
UE[Abs]i:  Mean  
Median 
N 
0.7507628 
0.4137930 
11704 
0.7513998 
0.4137930 
11010 
0.7406571 
0.4104170 
694 
0.0471 
0.8282 
 
 
†: Implicit null hypothesis that the particular variables are equal across geographic regions is rejected at the α=0.05 confidence 
level using two-tailed Chi-Square Kruskal-Wallis tests.  Values of the Kruskal-Wallis Chi-Square test statistic are shown and the 
related probability values are indicated directly below. 
 
 
The dependent and independent control variables discussed previously are employed in regression analyses 
designed to assessing systematic differences in the statistical association between analysts earnings forecast error 
and forecast bias and actual earnings changes for European countries of domicile between Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe.  Analysts earnings forecast error and forecast bias appear as dependent variables in two regression 
equations.  Each of the two regression equations is analyzed using three specifications integrating Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe country of domicile parameter estimation constraints in order to illustrate the sensitivity of the 
results to specification.   
 
Model (1) through Model (3) utilize analysts earnings forecast accuracy as the dependent variable and are 
shown immediately below.  For Model (1) both the intercept and earnings change slope coefficients are constrained 
to varying across Eastern Europe and Western Europe country of domicile geographic regions without regard to 
country specific degree of IFRS implementation.  For Model (2) the intercept are constrained to varying only in 
relation to country specific degree of IFRS implementation without regard to the Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe country of domicile geographic region characterization.  For Model (3) both the intercept and earnings 
change slope coefficients are allowed to vary between both Eastern Europe and Western Europe country of domicile 
geographic regions and country specific degree of IFRS implementation.   
 
 
Model (1) Geographic Region – East Europe and West Europe:  H01:  a 5 = 0 a 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level 
(Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi = a0 + a1 ·Crossi + a2 · Yeari + a3 · Industryi +  
                                      +  a4 · UEi    + a5 · D[Region]i  + a6 · X[Region]i  + υi 
 
 
Model (2) IAS Degree of Implementation H02:  b 5 = 0 b 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi = b0 + a1 ·Crossi + b2 · Yeari + b3 · Industryi +   
                                                           +   b4 · UEi   + b5 · D[IAS]i + b6 · X[IAS]i  +  vi 
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Model (3) Geographic Region and IAS Interaction H03:  c 9 = 0 c 10 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed 
t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi =  c0 + c1 ·Crossi + c2 · Yeari + c3 · Industryi +   c4 · UEi    
                                       + c5 · D[Region]i  + c6 · X[Region]i   
                                       + c7 · D[IAS]i + c8 · X[IAS]i  
                                       +  c9 · D[Region]i  · D[IAS]i + c10 · X[Region]i  · X[IAS]i + wi 
 
Across the three regression specifications the coefficients of primary interest pertain to the differential magnitude of 
forecast accuracy and the degree of association between magnitudes of earnings changes and earnings forecast 
accuracy (i.e., a6, b6, and c10) and in all cases the significance of the coefficient is statistically tested using two-tailed 
hypotheses tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  If the null hypothesis is rejected the 
result provides an indication that analysts earnings forecast accuracy is larger or smaller (i.e., depending on whether 
the estimated coefficient is greater than zero or less than zero) between East European and West European countries 
of domicile, country specific degree of IFRS implementation, and their interaction. 
 
Model (4) through Model (6) utilize analysts earnings forecast bias as the dependent variable and are 
shown immediately below.  In Model (4) both of the regression intercept and earnings change slope coefficients are 
not required to be equal between Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions.  For Model (5) both of the 
regression intercept and earnings change slope coefficients are allowed to vary in relation to country specific degree 
of IFRS implementation.  In Model (6) both the intercept and earnings change slope coefficients are allowed to take 
different values over both Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions, country specific degree of IFRS 
implementation, as well as their interaction.   
 
In these regression specifications the coefficient of primary interest pertains to systematic differences in the 
magnitude of earnings forecast bias and degree of association of earnings forecast bias with earnings changes (i.e., 
a6, b6, and c10) between Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions, country specific degree of IFRS 
implementation, as well as their interaction, and in all cases the significance of the coefficient is statistically tested 
using two-tailed hypotheses tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  Rejecting the null 
hypothesis provides an indication that analysts earnings forecast bias is either larger or smaller (i.e., is either more or 
less associated with the tendency of earnings forecast errors to be greater than zero) in relation to country of 
domicile Eastern Europe and Western Europe geographic regions, country specific degree of IFRS implementation, 
and their interaction. 
 
Model (4) Geographic Region – East Europe and West Europe:  H01:  a 5 = 0 a 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level 
(Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi = a0 + a1 ·Crossi + a2 · Yeari + a3 · Industryi  
                              +  a4 · UEi    + a5 · D[Region]i  + a6 · X[Region]i  + υi 
 
 
Model (5) IAS Degree of Implementation H02:  b 5 = 0 b 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi = b0 + a1 ·Crossi + b2 · Yeari + b3 · Industryi  
                                               +   b4 · UEi   + b5 · D[IAS]i + b6 · X[IAS]i  +  vi 
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Model (6) Geographic Region and IAS Interaction H03:  c 9 = 0 c 10 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed 
t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi =  c0 + c1 ·Crossi + c2 · Yeari + c3 · Industryi +   c4 · UEi    
                               + c5 · D[Region]i  + c6 · X[Region]i   
                               + c7 · D[IAS]i + c8 · X[IAS]i   
                               +  c9 · D[Region]i  · D[IAS]i + c10 · X[Region]i  · X[IAS]i + wi 
 
 
STATISTICAL MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
 
Table No.4 shows the empirical model estimation and statistical results for Model (1) through Model (3) 
utilizing analysts earnings forecast accuracy as the dependent variable.
10
  The most striking result is reflected in 
Model (3) wherein both the East European country of domicile firms and country specific degree of implementation 
of IFRS reduce earnings forecast accuracy in the sense that the statistical association between magnitudes of actual 
earnings changes and magnitudes of earnings forecast errors decreases for these firms – indicating that a given 
earnings change decreases the related earnings forecast error.  Both H01 and H02 are rejected at the at the α=0.05 
confidence level using two-tailed t-tests indicating that the slope qualitative variable coefficients are significantly 
less that zero for both the East European country of domicile firms and country specific degree of implementation of 
IFRS.  Furthermore, H03 is rejected at the at the α=0.05 confidence level using two-tailed t-tests indicating that the 
interaction of East European country of origin and degree of implementation of IFRS are jointly statistically 
significant.  Consequently, we conclude from these statistical results that – although the overall level of analysts 
earnings forecasts accuracy is smaller for East European firms - the analysts have a more difficult task forecasting 
earnings for East European firms and is probably attributable less rapid implementation of more uniformly 
acceptable accounting practices such as IFRS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 .  Model adjusted R-Squares range from 29.04% for Model (1) to 29.62% for Model (3).  The impact of changes in 
constraining the intercept and earnings change coefficients across observations for Eastern Europe and Western Europe 
geographic regions and degree of implementation of IFRS is a modest increase in model explanatory power. 
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Table 4 
Results of Cross-Sectional Analysts Earnings Forecast Accuracy Regression With  
And Without IAS Reporting Standards Constraints 
 
 
Coefficients For Independent Variables 
Model 1:R2= 0.2904 
(DF = 1,771) 
Model 2: R2=0.2903 
(DF = 1,771) 
Model 3: R2=0.2962 
(DF = 1,771) 
Intercept  
 2.06966 
(22.86) † 
 
1.63176 
(16.19) † 
 
1.67151 
(16.59) † 
Crossi :  Coefficient                      Cross 
Listing Qualitative Variable 
 
  -0.03078 
 (-0.95) 
 
  -0.06206 
 (-1.93) 
 
  -002402 
 (-0.74) 
Yeari: Coefficient 
Annual Qualitative Variable 
 
-0.11178  
(-20.39)† 
 
-0.10949 
(-20.04)† 
 
-0.11513 
(-21.02)† 
Industryi: Coefficient 
Two-Digit SIC Indicator 
 
0.000062  
(0.17) 
 
-0.0000223                  
(-0.06) 
 
0.0000629              
(0.17) 
UEi: Coefficient                    Unexpected 
Earnings 
0.58005                               
(61.04)† (1)‡ 
0.81962                               
(17.40)† (2)‡ 
0.86193                               
(18.14)† (1)‡ 
(a): D[Region]i i: Differential Coefficient                         
East Europe Unexpected Earnings 
-0.19401                        
(-4.78)† (1)‡ 
[Not Applicable] 1.72733                        
(3.78)† (1)‡ 
(b): X[Region]i: Differential Coefficient                         
East Europe Unexpected Earnings 
-0.06920                        
(-2.00)† (1)‡ 
[Not Applicable] -1.40894                        
(-2.91)† (1)‡ 
(c): D[IFRS]i i: Differential Coefficient      
Implementation of IFRS                         
[Not Applicable] 0.10812                               
(7.90)† (2)‡ 
0.12372                        
(8.98)† (2)‡ 
(d): XIFRS]i: Differential Coefficient                         
Implementation of IFRS                         
[Not Applicable] -0.06665                               
(-5.28)† (2)‡ 
-0.07673                        
(-6.02)† (2)‡ 
(e): D[RegionxIAS]i:  East European 
Implementation IFRS Interaction 
[Not Applicable] [Not Applicable] -050509                        
(-4.29)† (3)‡ 
(f): X[RegionxIAS]i:  East European 
Implementation IFRS Interaction 
[Not Applicable] [Not Applicable] 0.35514                        
(4.36)† (3)‡ 
 
 
(a):  D[Region]i:  An integer valued qualitative variable taking a value of one if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm is 
uniquely from one of the former Russian republics employed in this sample and is assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research 
design in this manner allows for the intercept of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and 
East European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
(b): X[Region]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm is from 
one of the former Russian republics employed in this sample and is assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research design in this 
manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and East 
European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
(c): D[IAS]i:  An integer valued monotonic increasing (e.g., 0,1,2,3) index of the degree of implementation of IFRS for each 
sample firms country of domicile. 
(d): X[IAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of the product of the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm 
degree of implementation of IFRS and the magnitude of the ith sample firm actual earnings change.  Research design in this 
manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the various degrees of 
implementation of IFRS subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results – i.e., X[IAS]i:  = D[IAS]i x UEi 
(e): D[RegionxIAS]i:  Integer valued interaction qualitative variable capturing the interaction between firms country of domicile 
degree of implementation of IAS and firms being characterized as domiciled in an East European or West European home 
country. The variable will take values of either zero or integer values one through four since it is measured as the product of IASi 
and D[Region]I (i.e., D[RegionxIAS]I = D[IAS]i x D[Region]I). 
(f); X[RegionxIAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm 
uses the lowest level of IFRS, is monotonic increasing in relation to degree of IFRS implementation, and zero otherwise.  
Research design in this manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ in relation to 
home country degee of implementation of IFRS. The variable is measured as the product of X[IAS]i and X[Region]I (i.e., 
X[RegionxIAS]i = IASX[Region]i x X[Region]I). 
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(Table 4 Continued …) 
 
†: Null implicit null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero is rejected at the α=0.05 confidence level using two-tailed t-
tests.  The critical t-statistic value for the two-tailed t-tests is t  = 1.95. 
‡: The specified null hypothesis (shown below) rejected at the α=0.05 confidence level using one-tailed t-tests, two-tailed t-tests, 
one-tailed F-tests, or two-tailed F-tests as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.  Related probability values for each test 
are shown parenthetically.  
 
 
Model (1) Geographic Region – East Europe and West Europe:  H01:  a 5 = 0 a 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed 
t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi = a0 + a1 ·Crossi + a2 · Yeari + a3 · Industryi +  
                                      +  a4 · UEi    + a5 · D[Region]i  + a6 · X[Region]i  + υi 
 
 
Model (2) IAS Degree of Implementation H02:  b 5 = 0 b 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi = b0 + a1 ·Crossi + b2 · Yeari + b3 · Industryi +   
                                                           +   b4 · UEi   + b5 · D[IAS]i + b6 · X[IAS]i  +  vi 
 
 
Model (3) Geographic Region and IAS Interaction H03:  c 9 = 0 c 10 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Accuracyi =  c0 + c1 ·Crossi + c2 · Yeari + c3 · Industryi +   c4 · UEi    
                                       + c5 · D[Region]i  + c6 · X[Region]i   
                                       + c7 · D[IAS]i + c8 · X[IAS]i  
                                       +  c9 · D[Region]i  · D[IAS]i + c10 · X[Region]i  · X[IAS]i + wi 
 
Table No.5 shows the empirical model estimation and statistical results for Model (4) through Model (6) 
utilizing analysts earnings forecast bias as the dependent variable.
11
  The particularly noteworthy result is indicated 
by Model (3) wherein both the East European country of domicile firms and country specific degree of 
implementation of IFRS reduce earnings forecast bias in the sense that the statistical relation between magnitudes of 
actual earnings changes and magnitudes of earnings forecast errors decreases algebraically for these firms – 
indicating that a given earnings change decreases the tendency for the related earnings forecast error to be positive.  
Both H01 and H02 are rejected at the at the α=0.05 confidence level using two-tailed t-tests indicating that the slope 
qualitative variable coefficients are significantly less that zero for both the East European country of domicile firms 
and country specific degree of implementation of IFRS.  In addition, H03 is rejected at the at the α=0.05 confidence 
level using two-tailed t-tests indicating that the interaction of East European country of origin and degree of 
implementation of IFRS are jointly statistically significant.  Consequently, we conclude from these statistical results 
that – although the overall level of analysts earnings forecasts bias is less for East European firms - the 
implementation of more uniformly acceptable accounting practices such as IFRS tends to reduce the systematic 
optimistic bias displayed in general by equity securities analysts earnings forecasts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 .  Model adjusted R-Squares range from 27.79% for Model (4) to 28.75% for Model (6).  The impact of not constraining the 
intercept and earnings change coefficients to the same values for all geographic regions is an increase in model explanatory 
power. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fourth Quarter 2008  Volume 24, Number 4 
 77 
Table 5 
Results of Cross-Sectional Analysts Earnings Forecast Bias Regression With  
And Without Degree of IFRS Implementation Constraints 
 
 
 
Coefficients For Independent Variables 
Model 1:R2= 0.2837 
(DF = 1,771) 
Model 2: R2=0.2822 
(DF = 1,771) 
Model 3: R2=0.2869 
(DF = 1,771) 
Intercept  
-2.34376 
(-23.37) † 
 
-2.13745 
(-19.95) † 
 
-2.21488 
(-20.64) † 
Crossi :  Coefficient                      Cross Listing 
Qualitative Variable 
 
  0.07269 
 (2.01) 
 
  0.10851 
 (3.03) 
 
  0.06931 
 (1.92) 
Yeari: Coefficient 
Annual Qualitative Variable 
 
0.11973 
(19.67)† 
 
0.11634 
(19.18)† 
 
0.12228 
(20.09)† 
Industryi: Coefficient 
Two-Digit SIC Indicator 
 
-0.00018237 
(-0.45) 
 
-0.00008959                
(-0.22) 
 
-0.00015952                 
(-0.40† 
UEi: Coefficient                    Unexpected 
Earnings 
0.49208                 
(60.19)† (1)‡ 
0.67741                               
(17.58)† (2)‡ 
0.70278                               
(18.07)† (1)‡ 
(a): D[Region]i i: Differential Coefficient                         
East Europe Unexpected Earnings 
0.25965                         
(7.26)† (1)‡ 
[Not Applicable] -0.28469                         
(-0.76)† (1)‡ 
(b): X[Region]i: Differential Coefficient                         
East Europe Unexpected Earnings 
-0.03123                       
(-1.03)† (1)‡ 
[Not Applicable] -0.86194                        
(-3.40)† (1)‡ 
(c): D[IFRS]i i: Differential Coefficient                         
Implementation of IFRS 
[Not Applicable] -0.03985                        
(-3.52)† (2)‡ 
-0.04800                         
(-4.21)† (2)‡ 
(d): X[IFRS]i: Differential Coefficient                         
Implementation of IFRS 
[Not Applicable] -0.05213                        
(-5.01)† (2)‡ 
-0.05863                        
(-5.58)† (2)‡ 
(e): D[RegionxIAS]i:  East European 
Implementation IFRS Interaction 
[Not Applicable] [Not Applicable] 0.14532                         
(1.51)† (3)‡ 
(f): X[RegionxIAS]i:  East European 
Implementation IFRS Interaction East  
[Not Applicable] [Not Applicable 0.22418                        
(3.33)† (3)‡ 
 
(a):  D[Region]i:  An integer valued qualitative variable taking a value of one if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm is 
uniquely from one of the former Russian republics employed in this sample and is assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research 
design in this manner allows for the intercept of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and 
East European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
(b): X[Region]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm is from 
one of the former Russian republics employed in this sample and is assigned a value of zero otherwise.  Research design in this 
manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the West European and East 
European subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results. 
(c): D[IAS]i:  An integer valued monotonic increasing (e.g., 0,1,2,3) index of the degree of implementation of IFRS for each 
sample firms country of domicile. 
(d): X[IAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of the product of the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm 
degree of implementation of IFRS and the magnitude of the ith sample firm actual earnings change.  Research design in this 
manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ between the various degrees of 
implementation of IFRS subsets in a manner systematically impacting the statistical results – i.e., X[IAS]i:  = D[IAS]i x UEi 
(e): D[RegionxIAS]i:  Integer valued interaction qualitative variable capturing the interaction between firms country of domicile 
degree of implementation of IAS and firms being characterized as domiciled in an East European or West European home 
country. The variable will take values of either zero or integer values one through four since it is measured as the product of IASi 
and D[Region]I (i.e., D[RegionxIAS]I = D[IAS]i x D[Region]I). 
(f); X[RegionxIAS]i:  A real valued quantitative variable taking a value of UEi if the country of domicile of the i
th sample firm 
uses the lowest level of IFRS, is monotonic increasing in relation to degree of IFRS implementation, and zero otherwise.  
Research design in this manner allows for the UEi slope coefficient of the regression model to systematically differ in relation to 
home country degee of implementation of IFRS. The variable is measured as the product of X[IAS]i and X[Region]I (i.e., 
X[RegionxIAS]i = IASX[Region]i x X[Region]I). 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fourth Quarter 2008  Volume 24, Number 4 
 78 
(Table 5 Continued …) 
 
†: Null implicit null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero is rejected at the α=0.05 confidence level using two-tailed t-
tests.  The critical t-statistic value for the two-tailed t-tests is t  = 1.95. 
‡: The specified null hypothesis (shown below) rejected at the α=0.05 confidence level using one-tailed t-tests, two-tailed t-tests, 
one-tailed F-tests, or two-tailed F-tests as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.  Related probability values for each test 
are shown parenthetically.  
 
 
Model (4) Geographic Region – East Europe and West Europe:  H01:  a 5 = 0 a 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed 
t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi = a0 + a1 ·Crossi + a2 · Yeari + a3 · Industryi  
                              +  a4 · UEi    + a5 · D[Region]i  + a6 · X[Region]i  + υi 
 
 
Model (5) IAS Degree of Implementation H02:  b 5 = 0 b 6 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi = b0 + a1 ·Crossi + b2 · Yeari + b3 · Industryi  
                                               +   b4 · UEi   + b5 · D[IAS]i + b6 · X[IAS]i  +  vi 
 
 
Model (6) Geographic Region and IAS Interaction H03:  c 9 = 0 c 10 = 0 at α=0.05 confidence level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
Forecast Biasi =  c0 + c1 ·Crossi + c2 · Yeari + c3 · Industryi +   c4 · UEi    
                               + c5 · D[Region]i  + c6 · X[Region]i   
                               + c7 · D[IAS]i + c8 · X[IAS]i   
                               +  c9 · D[Region]i  · D[IAS]i + c10 · X[Region]i  · X[IAS]i + wi 
 
 
Table 6 
Summary Of Forecast Accuracy Regression Models (1) – (3)  
and Forecast Bias Regression Models (4) – (6) Hypotheses Tests 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Analysts Earning Forecast Accuracy:  Comparison of West European and East European Countries Of 
Domicile 
 
Model/Hypothesis East vs. West 
H01:  a 6 = 0 
Degree IFRS 
H02:  b 6 = 0 
Interaction H03:   
c 9 = 0 and c 10 = 0 
 
Model (1)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
Model (2)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
Model (3)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 confidence 
level (Two-Tailed t-Test). 
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(Table 6 Continued …) 
Figure 2 Analysts Earning Forecast Bias:  Comparison of West European and East European Countries Of Domicile 
 
Model/Hypothesis East vs. West 
H01:  a 6 = 0 
Degree IFRS 
H02:  b 6 = 0 
Interaction H03:   
c 9 = 0 and c 10 = 0 
 
Model (4)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
Model (5)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
 
[Not Applicable] 
 
Model (6)  
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
Reject at the  α=0.05 
confidence level (Two-Tailed t-
Test). 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this research is to describe the impact of country specific degree of implementation of IFRS 
upon analysts earnings forecast accuracy and bias for firms having countries of domicile in East Europe as compared 
with West Europe.  We find that firms from East Europe countries have analysts earnings forecasts which display 
less earnings forecast accuracy and a tendency to exhibit less positive bias than firms from West Europe.   We 
attribute the tendency for East European firms to have less accurate and less positively skewn earnings forecasts to 
the larger marginal benefit of former Soviet republics implementing uniformly accepted quality accounting 
standards such as IFRS in their particularly information environment.    
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